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IntroDuctIon
the importance of citizens participation within governance processes has currently 
gained wide attention, both in academic discourse and actual practice. analysts 
have used theoretical constructs such as deliberative democracy or participatory 
democracy to analyze the scope and limitations of people’s participation in the 
process of governance, through a review of the traditional democracy theories. 
effective participation by all stakeholders at local levels of government and reduc-
tion of social exclusion and political apathy have come to be viewed as a necessary 
condition for promoting good governance and a cohesive society.
the shift of focus towards new horizontal governance models (as opposed to 
the traditional vertical ones) in recent years highlights a fundamental need to 
reconceptualize public sector. In this regard, participatory governance practices 
(edwards, 2002; lovan, murray and shaffer, 2004; osmani, 2007) are aimed to 
provide non-government actors, both individuals and organizations, with a means 
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aBstract 
objectives. the present study aimed at testing 
whether costs, trustworthiness of government, 
and expected voice could predict citizens’ will-
ingness to get involved in participatory go-
vernance processes.  participants and setting. 
research participants were one-hundred and 
ninety-two volunteer students of sapienza uni-
versity of rome, 66% female. Hypotheses. We 
hypothesized both main effects of trust (posi-
tive) and expected costs (negative) and an in-
teractive effect of the two variables on citizens’ 
willingness to participate. We also expected 
voice to be a mediator of such an interaction 
effect on willingness to participate. statisti-
cal analyses. a 2 (costs) by 2 (trust) anoVa 
was applied both to manipulation checks and 
to motivation to participate. Following this, 
we performed a bootstrap mediated modera-
tion analysis (Hayes, 2013). results. motiva-
tion to participate was significantly affected 
by trust, in fact participants in the high trust 
condition, were more willing to participate 
(M = 3.84, SD = .91) rather than those in the 
low trust condition (M = 3.31, SD = .99). 
also, a main effect of costs emerged, with low 
costs inducing higher motivation to participate 
(M = 3.73, SD = .92) than high costs 
(M = 3.41, SD = 1.03). more importantly, these 
effects were qualified by the predicted interac-
tion between costs and trust: while in the high 
trust condition costs did not affect willingness 
to participate, in the low costs condition they 
made a significant difference. Finally, medi-
ated moderation analysis showed that that ex-
pected voice was responsible for the impact of 
the trust by costs interaction on motivation to 
participate. limitation. the main limitation of 
the study concerns generalizability of its re-
sults across populations of different ages and 
occupation.  
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to genuinely and actively be part of the process of developing policy. such pro-
cesses have taken hold as intermediary spaces that readjust the boundaries between 
the state and its citizens, establishing new places in which participants from both 
can engage each other in new ways.
therefore new deliberative institutions seek to colonize the state power by 
transforming the interfaces between local citizens and higher levels of govern-
ment where citizens are viewed as an integral part of governance processes and 
their active involvement is considered essential in the substantive decisions fac-
ing a community.
aDVantaGes anD pItFalls In  partIcIpatIon
citizens’ participation in governance processes is largely recognized as a valuable 
process (nylen 2002; Buchy and race 2001). the arguments in favor of enhanc-
ing citizen participation frequently focus on the benefits of the process itself as 
stated by King and stivers (1998), suggesting that improved citizen participation 
could stop the deterioration of public trust evidenced by widespread hostility to-
ward government entities.
citizen involvement is intended to produce better decisions, and thus more 
benefits for the entire society (Beierle, 1999). Irvin and stansbury (2004) suggest 
a list of advantages, distinguishing between those concerning citizens and go-
vernments. Both citizens and governments are likely to learn from each other, the 
former becoming citizen-experts, understanding technically difficult situations and 
seeing holistic, community-wide solutions, while the latter would also benefit from 
receiving education on specific community groups’ positions. also, both citizens 
and governments may have the chance to improve their persuading skills on the 
other part in order to achieve acceptance of its own instances.
However, a number of authors claimed that participatory governance practices 
are not always rational nor exempt from critical issues. as one of the authors re-
marked (antonini and Fini, 2011), one of the most common problems concerning 
public participation is to effectively encourage citizens to concretely participate 
in policymaking (and to political life in general) and it is not unusual for citizens 
to still staunchly refuse to get directly involved in policymaking. participation is 
inevitably selective and it may occur that some individuals recognized as relevant 
participants are considered to be part of the citizenry, while those excluded are 
left without a voice, without a way to express their involvement and enact their 
citizenship (o’neill, 2001; turnhout, Van Bommel and aarts, 2010). Furthermore, 
participation may repress differences requiring citizens to achieve consensus that 
is considered to be a robust basis for high quality and legitimate decisions (Innes 
and Booher, 2003). 
In sum, when given the opportunity to participate in policymaking one cannot 
automatically assume that citizens will chose to do so. Declining rates of citizens, 
participation mean on one hand fewer opportunities for state and local govern-
ments to understand the needs and concerns of their constituents, on the other hand 
less participation enhances itself a cleavage between citizens and politicians in a 
situation of big changes.
the present study aimed at assessing whether expected costs and benefits, and 
factors related to the quality of the relationship between citizens and their public 
administration, such as trust toward the administration and perceived voice, can 
affect citizens’ motivation to participate in public policymaking. 
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Before describing the experimental study, in the following section we will briefly 
review literature concerning these variables.
The rational choice explanation of citizens’ participation
rational choice scholars have typically approached people’s motivation to par-
ticipate in politics (i.e., voting) adopting models based on pure self-interest (e.g., 
aldrich, 1993; Downs, 1957; Feddersen and pesendorfer, 1996; ledyard, 1981; 
palfrey, rosenthal, 1985) and expected value (e.g., ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; 
Feather, 1982) thought in terms of collective action. according to such a perspec-
tive, political participation could be considered as the result of a rational costs-
benefits evaluation.
social movement research has typically viewed the motivation to participate 
as a function of the individual as well as collective costs of participation (Klan-
dermans, 1984, 1997; oberschall, 1980; opp, 1989, 2001; stürmer and simon, 
2004). perceived material or psychological costs of participation can reduce pub-
lic willingness to participate: those are usually related to energy level (Fishkin, 
1997), economic loss and time investment (abelson et al., 1995; Grant, 1994). 
similarly, benefits include not only material advantages but also psychological 
and social ones: satisfaction (Hirschmann, 2002), sense of belonging and social 
status rewards (Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996).
although the costs approach seems useful to precisely grasp the individual 
determinants of willingness to get engaged, on the other hand such a rational-
choice approach paints an over-individualistic picture. therefore, only focusing on 
individual advantages and drawbacks may not provide an exhaustive framework 
leading to ignore how people’s decisions are influenced by their relationship with 
the administration government as well as the extent to which they believe their 
voice will be heard. 
Trust in government as a tenet of participation
Within public policymaking it is often the government that encourages citizens to 
participate. In this type of participation processes where governments reach out 
to their citizens, it is necessary that citizens trust their government administration 
in order to get actively involved. thus, as trust in authority is an important psy-
chological antecedent of collective behavior (e.g. De cremer and Van Vugt, 1999; 
tyler, 1989; Van Vugt and De cremer, 1999), we will take into account the role of 
trust in predicting citizens’ motivation to participate in public policymaking.
In contemporary political debates and scientific literature on the subject, there is 
a growing recognition on the part of administrators that decision-making without 
public participation is ineffective. although trust in government is a nebulous and 
contested notion (Goldfinch, Gauld and Herbison, 2009), it is inevitably important 
in democratic society, because democracies rely on the voluntary compliance of 
citizens to authorities’ rules (lenard, 2008). In terms of government actions or 
behaviour, trust in government can encompass whether one expects a government 
will act more-or-less in one’s and/or the public’s interest; and/or more-or-less 
legally, legitimately and ethically; as well as perform its jobs adequately (noot-
eboom, 2002). Basically, a trustworthy government is one whose procedures for 
making and implementing policy meet prevailing standards of fairness and which 
is capable of credible commitments.
Furthermore, trustworthiness is also a central tenet of the extent to which 
citizens accept or reject decisions taken by a decision makers (terwel et al., 
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2010). people who know that an authority is trustworthy are more likely to accept 
the decision taken by the authority than people who know that the authority is 
untrustworthy. therefore, one can assume that citizens’ trust in public authorities 
is necessary in order to achieve public consent for political decisions and more in 
general trustworthiness provides a government a stable context where achieving 
public decisions will thus be easier than in a distrusting atmosphere. 
although controversial outcomes have emerged from studies on the relationship 
between perceived trust in institutions and participation, evidences support the 
idea that citizens’ participation can only be developed on the basis of a recipro-
cal trust between people and institutions (alford, 2001; orren, 1997; uslaner 
and Brown, 2005; mannarini, Fedi and trippetti, 2010). From a rational point 
of view (perry and Wise, 1990) citizens are likely to trust their government only 
to the extent they believe that it will act in their interests, that its procedures 
are fair, and that their trust of the state and of others is reciprocated. this is the 
condition necessary to produce behavioral compliance with government demands 
even when individual’s costs somewhat exceed individual benefits and even in 
the absence of strong ideological convictions that make costs totally irrelevant 
(levi, 1998).
therefore, building on the claim of a number of authors that trust should elicit 
more participatory behavior than distrust (almond, 1989), we will assess the im-
pact of trust on citizens’ engagement. specifically, we hypothesize that trustwor-
thiness should foster citizens’ involvement in participatory processes, since the 
more trustworthy citizens perceive government to be, the more likely they are to 
comply with its demands (e.g., levi, 1989, 1997; levi and stoker, 2000; tyler, 
1989, 2006). also, we expect that when citizens trust their administration govern-
ment costs will not be relevant in determining their willingness to participate. In 
fact, in a condition of trustworthiness, costs may be thought as necessary individual 
losses in order to achieve superordinate collective goals.
Voice effect and participation: when citizens’ opinions matter
Voice effect is explained by presuming that a person given an opportunity to ex-
press his/her views will believe that voice will help controlling the outcomes of a 
decision-making process and that these expectations will lead to higher procedural 
fairness judgments (thibaut and Walker, 1975). people value voice because it 
suggests that their views are worthy of hearing and procedures that accord people 
status in this way are viewed favorably. thibaut and Walker (1975) articulated a 
psychological model to explain procedural preferences suggesting that the distri-
bution of control between participants and the third party is the key procedural 
characteristic shaping people’s views about both fairness and desirability.
Furthermore, several experimental and theoretical works introduced the voice 
effect into the analyses of participation showing interesting results. earley and 
Kanfer (1985) reported that voice-based participation in earlier rather than later 
stages of decision making has a stronger, more positive impact on satisfaction and 
performance. similarly, lawler (1975) suggested that having a voice is not only a 
way of being active within the decision-making process: in his view, voice evenly 
overlaps with participation, which means that expressing one’s own opinion is the 
only way for participating in decision-making.
thus, we expect that the extent to which citizens anticipate that their opinions 
will influence the final decision, that is expected voice effect will at least partially 
mediate the impact of costs and trust on citizens’ willingness to participate.
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summarizing, we hypothesized both main effects of trust (positive) and expected 
costs (negative) and an interactive effect of the two variables on citizens’ willing-
ness to participate. moreover, we also expected voice to be a mediator of such an 
interaction effect on willingness to participate.
Participants and design
research participants were one-hundred and ninety-two volunteer students, 66% 
female, mage between 20 and 40 years old (measured on an 20 year-interval scale 
on 4 points, m = 2.07, sD = .687). participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four experimental conditions of a 2 (High vs. low trust) x 2 (High vs. low ex-
pected costs) between subjects design. Willingness to participate in policymaking 
was the main dependent variable. 
Procedure and manipulation of independent variables 
after being given an informed consent, participants were told the purpose of study 
was an examination of participatory governance engagement. then, participants 
were given the prompt of the study: firstly participants were asked to read a sce-
nario and try to identify with it, subsequently they should respond to a number of 
questions. accordingly, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions (High vs. low costs and High vs. low trust in govern-
ment), manipulated through asking them respectively: 
High costs: Try to imagine that regardless your personal interest for the project, 
you will realize that participating will entail high costs. A large amount of time 
will be asked to all participants so that you will have to withdraw your work, 
study or family and personal commitments; moreover, it may occur that clear 
and exact decisions as well as consent with other participants will be hard to 
achieve. Lastly, it may occur conflicts with other participants that may reflect 
into your everyday life. These costs (as well as others that you may imagine), 
will be a necessary effect of such a participation. this manipulation was adapted 
from previous research examining the costs-benefits of political participation 
(Wandersman et al., 1987).
low costs: Try to imagine that regardless your personal interest for the project, 
you will realize that participating will entail low costs. A little amount of time 
will be asked to all participants so that you will not have to withdraw any of your 
work, study or family and personal commitments; moreover, you will be supported 
in achieving clear and exact decisions as well as consent with other participants. 
Lastly, it may occur that relationships with other citizens will benefit from such 
experience. Any possible costs, (as well as others that you may imagine) will thus 
be limited as possible. this manipulation was adapted from previous research exa-
mining the costs-benefits of political participation (Wandersman et al., 1987).
High trust: moreover, the administration government has a good reputation, 
having shown across years a great care for citizens’need: his political model is 
particularly connected with society’s needs which represent a set of guidelines 
for political action aimed to satisfy citizens’ needs. this manipulation was created 
for the purpose of this study.
low trust: moreover, the administration government has not a good reputation, 
having shown across years a lack of care for citizens’need: his political model is 
not particularly connected with society’s needs, appearing more aimed to respond 
to the political concerns rather than to satisfy citizens’ needs. this manipulation 
was created for the purpose of this study.
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after being given the scenario, participants were asked to try to keep focusing 
on such a scenario while responding the subsequent set of questions.
measures
Finally, motivation to participate, manipulation check of trust, expected costs and 
voice were measured. 
– Willingness to participate: specifically participants responded two questions 
(1 not very much, 5 very much) measuring their likelihood to engage in the par-
ticipatory governance process highlighted within the scenario. (1) “Imagining 
to be one of the people described in the scenario, I would be willing to partici-
pate in policymaking as proposed by the depicted administration government”; 
(2) “whether the depicted administration government would be real I would be 
happy to engage in such a policymaking project” (α = .77). 
– Expected costs manipulation check: participants were asked to think about their 
expected difficulties and costs involved in political participation on a 5-point 
scale (1 not very much, 5 very much): (1) “the feeling of frustration from lack-
ing “real” results from participation”; (2) “the need to give up personal and 
family members for participation”; (3) “Interpersonal conflict with others dur-
ing participation”; (4) “Any other kind of costs you imagine” (α = .828). These 
questions were adapted from previous research examining costs of political 
participation (Wandersman et al., 1987).
– Trust manipulation check: participants then completed two-questions mea-
suring trust in the government on a 5-point scale (1 not very much, 5 very 
much): ‘to what extent do you trust the administration government?’ and, ‘to 
what extent do you consider the administration government to be trustworthy?’ 
(α = .96). These questions were adapted from previous research examining trust 
in authorities (de cremer and van Vugt, 1999).
– Voice: participants completed one item measuring voice on a 5-point scale (1 not 
very much, 5 very much): “In the light of the proposal received by the admi- 
nistration government, participating could be a chance to voice my own ideas”.
results
Expected Costs Manipulation check. a 2 (High vs. low costs) x 2 (High vs. low 
trust) anoVa on costs revealed the expected main effect of costs’ manipula-
tion, F(1, 188) = 19.01, p < .001, η2 = .09. more personal costs were expected in 
the high (M = 3.91, SD = .70) rather than in the low costs condition (M = 3.44, 
SD = .81). the anoVa also revealed a main effect of trust, F(1, 188) = 5.91, 
p = .02, η2 = .03, indicating that when high trust was induced participants ex-
pected less costs (M = 3.55, SD = .74) than in the low trust condition (M = 3.80, 
SD = .82). no other significant effects emerged.
Trust Manipulation check. a 2 (High vs. low costs) x 2 (High vs. low trust) 
anoVa was conducted on the score of perceived trust toward the administra-
tion. the main effect of trust, F(1, 188) = 75.78, p < .001, η2 = .29, confirmed 
the adequacy of the manipulation. more specifically, participants in the high trust 
condition reported higher scores (M = 3.41, SD = .78) than those in the low trust 
condition (M = 2.48, SD = .69). no other significant effects emerged.
Motivation to Participate. the 2 (High vs. low costs) x 2 (High vs. low trust) 
anoVa on motivation to participate highlighted a main effect of trust, F(1, 188 ) 
= 14.90, p < .001, η2 = .07, indicating that participants in the high trust condition 
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were more willing to participate (M = 3.84, SD = .91) than those in the low trust 
condition (M = 3.31, SD = .99). 
also, a main effect of expected costs emerged, F(1, 188 ) = 5.35, p = .02, 
η2 = .03. Inspection of means revealed that motivation to participate was more 
pronounced in the low expected costs condition (M = 3.73, SD = .92) rather than 
in the high costs condition (M = 3.41, SD = 1.03). 
more importantly, these effects were qualified by the predicted interaction be-
tween expected costs and trust, F(1, 188) = 3.93, p = .049, η2 = .02. as can be 
noted in Figure 1, in the high expected costs condition, participants were will-
ing to participate especially when they were in the trust condition (M = 3.82, 
SD = .92) rather than distrust (M = 3.03, SD = .98) the administration government, 
F(1, 188) = 17.46, p < .001, η2 = .09. When costs were expected to be low, motiva-
tion was relatively unaffected by trust, F(1, 188) = 1.72, p = .19.
simple effect analysis within the trust conditions showed that the manipula-
tion of costs only affected participants motivation when trust was low, F(1, 188) 
= 9.74, p = .002, η2 = .05, with high expected costs leading to reduced motivation 
(M = 3.03, SD = .98) as compared to low expected costs (M = 3.61, SD = .93). ex-
pected costs did not affect participants motivation when trust was high (F < 1).
Figure 1 motivation to participate as a function of trust and costs
Mediated Moderation Analysis. Voice was highly correlated with motivation 
to participate (r = .58, p < .001). Building on this association, we wanted to test 
whether voice could mediate the impact of the interaction between trust and ex-
pected costs on motivation. to test for the mediated moderation we first regressed 
motivation to participate on the interaction between our independent variables. as 
can be noted in Figure 2, the interaction had a significant impact on motivation 
to participate, β = .13, t = 1.98, p < .05. However, after controlling for voice, the 
interaction between trust and expected costs was not significant anymore, β = .03, 
t = .56, p = .55. this result suggests the presence of a full mediation. 
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the significance of the indirect effect was tested by mean of a bootstrap mediated 
moderation analysis (Hayes 2013). the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for 
the indirect effect of the interaction did not include zero (lower = .14; upper = .73), 
indicating that the indirect effect was significant.
DIscussIon
the general purpose of this study was to test whether previous findings con-
cerning participation in collective action could be extended to a diverse type of 
participation, specifically within participatory governance. more specifically, we 
expected a rational variable, such as expected costs, would interact with a more 
relational variable, such as trust in government, in predicting citizens’ willingness 
to participate. 
results highlighted a main effect for both costs expectations and trust in govern-
ment, with high costs reducing willingness to participate and high trust increas-
ing it. moreover, these variables interacted in predicting citizens’ willingness to 
participate. that is, when citizens trust their administration government they are 
willing to get engaged within policymaking regardless of costs, but when they do 
not trust the administration they are motivated to participate only if they expect 
low costs for the participation.
Furthermore, results revealed that voice mediated the interaction between ex-
pected costs and trust on willingness to participate. such a result highlighted that 
citizens’ engagement is primarily driven by the expectation that their own opinion 
will be taken into account and will have an impact on the final political decision 
(expected voice).
concerning the limitations of the present study, firstly we are aware that a 
sample of students may not be compared to an enlarged population. Indeed, it is 
possible to imagine that the effect of a costs manipulation may be different for 
another type of population. secondly, as part of the literature on civic engage-
ment focuses on groups processes (simon, 1998; stürmer and simon, 2004), we 
believe that further studies could interestingly analyze the relation between collec-
tive identification processes and the variables used in our study (see for example 
antonini et al., in press). 
Figure 2 mediated moderation analysis 
In brackets is the direct effect of the interaction between the independent variables on 
willingness to participate after controlling for voice. note: * = p<.05; **= p<.01
Voice
Costs x Trust Willingness to
Participateβ = .13* (β = .03)
β =
 .1
9*
*
β = .52**
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lastly, this study may imply some practical suggestions for public adminis-
trations who want to increase citizens’ participation. trusted governments can 
design participatory practices without worrying too much about how costs while, 
low-trusted ones must necessary design participation focusing on low costs for 
citizens. Finally, both types of administrations might try to construct communi-
cation campaigns by means of which citizens perceived voice is increased, since 
our results show that voice is the ultimate determinant of citizens’ willingness to 
participate.
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